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INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of American government and politics is a fascinating 
phenomenon known as the “Revolving Door Effect.” In short, the meta-
phorical revolving door describes the free transfer of employment from 
the public sector to the private sector and has been credited for numer-
ous political downfalls, regulatory oversights, and government scandals. 
One of the most egregious examples of the revolving door effect occurs 
when public officials leave office and immediately accept employment as 
private sector lobbyists. The two basic concerns of this practice are: (1) 
the fear that a public official’s decision-making and actions might be 
compromised or altered by the promise of future employment from a 
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corporation or industry; and (2) the notion that a past public official 
might have an unfair advantage when lobbying for the support of cur-
rent public officials, with whom he or she previously worked. The goal of 
this article is to enlighten the public about the prevalence of these em-
ployment transfers and argue that Idaho’s measures against the lobby-
ist revolving door are insufficient. Furthermore, after a comparative 
analysis, the article concludes that Idaho should enact waiting period 
legislation.  
Part I provides an overview of the scholarship on the revolving door 
effect, its impacts on society as a whole, and the unique dangers associ-
ated with the lobbyist revolving door. Part II narrows the emphasis to 
the measures taken by lawmakers at the federal level to mitigate the 
effects of the lobbyist revolving door. These measures fall into three 
general categories: (1) transparency measures; (2) prohibitions on quid 
pro quo arrangements; and (3) implementation of waiting periods. Part 
III analyzes Idaho’s responses to the revolving door, demonstrating that, 
although Idaho has adopted transparency measures and prohibitions on 
quid pro quo arrangements, Idaho is among the minority of states that 
have not enacted waiting period legislation. Then, Part IV engages in a 
comparative analysis of the states within the jurisdiction of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. The analysis looks for meaningful distinctions 
between states that have enacted waiting period legislation and those 
that have not. Drawing from the previous Parts, Part V argues that 
Idaho should adopt waiting period legislation for lobbyists and proposes 
draft legislation. Finally, Part VI contains some ending thoughts and 
further highlights the notion that Idaho is behind the times and should 
enact waiting period legislation sooner rather than later.  
PART I: THEORY OF REVOLVING DOOR PROHIBITIONS 
A. General Impacts of the Revolving Door 
The revolving door effect has impacted the governance and politics 
of the United States in numerous ways over the last several decades. 
Scholars blame the metaphorical revolving door between jobs in the 
public and private sector for impacting the manner in which govern-
ment officials regulate.1 The main assumption and cause for concern 
regarding the revolving door is the idea that public officials, while in 
their capacity as a government employee, make decisions and act in 
ways that will benefit the private corporation or industry for which they 
plan to become employed at the conclusion of their public sector em-
ployment.2 In recent years the revolving door effect has been credited for 
                                                       
 1. David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 
507, 508 (2013). 
 2. See id.  
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the Bernie Madoff scandal3 and the Gulf Coast oil spill.4 Although the 
impacts of the revolving door are highly publicized and scrutinized fol-
lowing scandals of this magnitude, the revolving door affects other as-
pects of politics and government on a daily basis.  
This article aims to focus on the effects of public officials becoming 
private lobbyists via the revolving door, at both the federal and state 
levels of government. Nonetheless, it is critical to have a general foun-
dation and understanding of the possible conflicts of interest present 
when individuals are permitted to freely transition in and out of public 
employment. Along with the general concerns about fraud and public 
deceit are the risks of numerous corrupt practices such as: (1) actual 
quid pro quo arrangements in which public officials are bribed or incen-
tivized by their future private sector employers; (2) undue access by pri-
vate sector employees into the public sector; and (3) regulatory capture.  
The first major concern of the revolving door is that it is “essential-
ly a bribe, paid through the prospect of lucrative future employment. 
The quid pro quo for the bribe is the promise to regulate lightly, or not 
at all.”5 The banking sector provides an example of the prevalence of 
this concern, and some argue that publicly employed regulators neglect 
their regulatory duties in an effort to aid large banks—in hope of future 
employment and a more lucrative salary with said banks.6 The exchange 
of loose regulatory oversight for future employment is by no means lim-
ited to the private banking sector, and some theorists contend that the 
conduct is prevalent in numerous government agencies, such as the De-
partments of Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, and Energy. 7  In re-
                                                       
 3. David Smyth, Breaking: Study Confirms What I Think, CADY BAR THE DOOR: 
INSIGHT & COMMENTARY ON SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME, (Aug. 
6, 2012), http://www.secmiscellany.com/2012/08/06/breaking-study-confirms-what-i-think/. In 
2009, Bernie Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison after conducting a “Ponzi scheme” 
in which he defrauded thousands of investors out of an estimated $65 billion. Many scholars 
blame the revolving door and Mr. Madoff’s involvement with the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission for the magnitude of his fraudulent scheme. Stephanie Yang, 5 Years 
Ago Bernie Madoff Was Sentenced to 150 Years in Prison – Here’s How His Scheme Worked, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (July 1, 2014, 6:54 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-bernie-
madoffs-ponzi-scheme-worked-2014-7.        
 4. The Revolving Door: Drilling Regulators Move to Big Oil Jobs and Back, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 27, 2010, 4:21 AM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/05/the_revolving_door_drilling_re.html (de-
tailing Jim Grant’s transfer of employment to British Petroleum prior to the major oil spill in 
April 2010).  
 5. Zaring, supra  note 1 at 512.  
 6. See Matt Levine, Strict Regulation Makes the Revolving Door Spin Faster, 
BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 26, 2014, 5:31 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-
06-26/strict-regulation-makes-the-revolving-door-spin-faster. 
 7. See Top Agencies, OPEN SECRETS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/top.php?display=G (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (listing 
the current number of revolving door people profiled in each government agency).  
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sponse, the federal government, as well as a majority of states, has 
adopted various forms of legislation prohibiting quid pro quo arrange-
ments.8  
A second, and equally concerning, impact of the revolving door is 
the amount of undue access that private sector corporations obtain by 
hiring former public officials. The main concern regarding undue access 
is the idea that large corporations gain “inside-knowledge, vital con-
tacts, and . . . powerful influence” when they employ an individual who 
formerly was responsible for regulating the industry in which the corpo-
ration is engaged.9 The basic argument is that the revolving door bene-
fits large corporations who are able to hire former public officials and 
use the new hire’s knowledge, expertise, experience, and contacts to the 
benefit of their corporate interests.10 Over the last several decades, the 
rate at which ex-regulators have been employed by private corporations 
has drastically increased.11 For example, public financial firms report 
they have expanded the hiring of past public officials in the United 
States between eighteen to fifty-five percent over the last ten years.12 
Furthermore, the flow of ex-regulators between the six major regulatory 
agencies and financial institutions within the United States has more 
than doubled following the most recent financial crisis.13  
A third concern of the revolving door effect is regulatory capture. 
One common definition of regulatory capture is “[a] process through 
which regulated monopolies end up manipulating . . . state agencies that 
are supposed to control them.”14 On a more basic level, regulatory cap-
ture occurs when regulation of an industry is directed away from public 
interest and instead focuses on the interest of the individual actors 
within the industry itself.15 The revolving door has been blamed for the 
                                                       
 8. See infra Part II.C. 
 9. Tamás Novák, Business, Politics and the Revolving Door in the European Un-
ion, GLOBAL VOICES (Nov. 16, 2013, 12:32 GMT), 
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/11/16/business-politics-and-the-revolving-door-in-the-
european-union/ (explaining the general concern of the revolving door and knowledge ac-
quired by corporations in the context of the European Union).  
 10. Kevin T. McGuire, Lobbyists, Revolving Doors and the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 
J. L. & POLITICS 113, 113 (2000).  
 11. See Dieter Zinnbauer, The Pros and Cons of the Revolving Door Practice – The 
Main Argument, ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH NETWORK (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://corruptionresearchnetwork.org/acrn-news/blog/the-pros-and-cons-of-the-revolving-
door-practice-2013-the-main-arguments.  
 12. Id. (citing Sophie Shive & Margaret Forster, The Revolving Door for Financial 
Regulators, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, 1 (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2348968.) 
 13. Zinnbauer, supra note 11, at n. 9 (citing D. Lucca et al., The Revolving Door and 
Worker Flows in Banking Regulation, NBER (2014)).  
 14. Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REVIEW OF 
ECONOMIC POLICYY no. 2, 203, 203 (2006). 
 15. Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special In-
terests Influences and How to Limit It, THE TOBIN PROJECT, 1–3 (2014), 
http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Introduction%20from%20Preve
nting%20Regulatory%20Capture.pdf. 
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occurrence of regulatory capture, most notably regarding the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).16 Some argue that the revolving door 
effect has allowed the SEC to become inundated with individuals regu-
lating in favor of certain industries, such as investment banks and 
hedge funds, to the degree that the line between the regulatory agency 
and the industries that it is charged with regulating has become 
blurred.17 These arguments are supported by the fact that several for-
mer SEC employees are now employed with private sector corporations 
for the sole purpose of helping the corporation influence SEC rulemak-
ing, counter investigations, and promote more lenient regulations from 
the regulatory agency.18  
Although it is difficult to quantify how much of a detriment these 
three effects of the revolving door have on governance and regulation 
within the United States, it is apparent that the transition of employ-
ment between the public and private sector is now a common practice. 
This raises questions, not only about the integrity of the individual(s) 
who traverse from the public to the private sector, but also about the 
honesty and integrity of the entire regulatory system. The concerns of 
quid pro quo arrangements, undue access, and regulatory capture are by 
no means the only effects caused by the revolving door; however, they 
are the effects that most directly correlate to the revolving door used by 
lobbyists at both the state and federal level. 
B. Lobbyists and the Revolving Door  
One key ingredient to the functionality of democracy in the United 
States is the ability of citizens to voice their opinions and be heard. Alt-
hough citizens have several methods to voice their opinions, lobbying is 
arguably the most direct method for a citizen to relay his or her senti-
ments. The term “lobby” is defined: “[t]o talk with or curry favor with a 
legislator . . . repeatedly or frequently, in an attempt to influence the 
legislator’s vote.”19 Further definitions include: “[t]o support or oppose (a 
measure) by working to influence the legislator’s vote” and “[t]o try to 
influence (a decision-maker).”20 In sum, a lobbyist is charged with the 
task of communicating to, working with, and influencing lawmakers at 
the various levels of government to initiate or vote for legislation in fa-
                                                       
 16. See Dangerous Liaisons: Revolving Door at SEC Creates Risk of Regulatory 
Capture, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT 2–8 (Feb. 11, 2013), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/602191/20130211-dangerous-
liaisons-sec-revolving-door.pdf.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 8–10.   
 19. Lobby, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).   
 20. Id.  
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vor of the individual lobbyist or the industry that the lobbyist repre-
sents.  
The number of individuals employed as lobbyists varies from year 
to year as the desires and needs of corporations, industries, and public 
interest groups fluctuate. A database compiled by the Center for Re-
sponsive Politics shows that the number of registered federal lobbyists 
in Washington, D.C. has exceeded 10,000 individuals since the year 
1998.21 On a state level, in 2015 there were 449 registered lobbyists in 
the state of Idaho alone.22 The number of lobbyists at the state level can 
also vary depending on numerous factors, such as the state’s population, 
demographics, number of corporations, and laws that impact or reduce 
the political reach of lobbyists.  
The profession of lobbying—at both the state and federal level—is 
continually changing as new laws are passed and “loopholes” in said 
laws are exploited. The three main concerns addressed above23 correlate 
directly with the individuals and corporations who spend an exorbitant 
amount of resources annually in an attempt to influence lawmakers. 
First, the concern of actual quid pro quo arrangements is justified based 
on the fear of elected officials accepting bribes in exchange for their vote 
or support for a lobbyist’s proposed initiative.24 Second, with a large 
number of past public officials accepting employment as lobbyists for 
various corporations and industries with specified interests, there is a 
concern of those entities obtaining undue access to regulatory agencies.25 
Finally, the risk of regulatory capture is heightened as more and more 
ex-regulators obtain employment as lobbyists for the corporations and 
industries that they previously regulated.26  
As noted above, the first main concern regarding the association of 
lobbyists and the revolving door effect is the fear of lawmakers engaging 
in quid pro quo arrangements. With the inherent nature of lobbying re-
quiring a lobbyist and lawmaker to spend large amounts of time togeth-
er—whether at dinners, receptions, sporting events, or elsewhere—the 
opportunities for the parties to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement 
are abundant.27 Furthermore, it is not uncommon for a lobbyist, or the 
                                                       
 21. Lobbying Database, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2016) (representing data obtained from the Senate Office of Public Records 
based on geographic location).  
 22. Lobbyists with Employers for 2015, OFFICE OF THE ID. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/lobbyist/2015/lobemp.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2016). 
 23. See supra Part I.A. 
 24. See, e.g., Peter Overby, Beyond Quid Pro Quo: What Counts As Political Corrup-
tion?, NPR (May 6, 2015 2:35 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/05/04/404052618/beyond-quid-pro-quo-what-
counts-as-political-corruption.  
 25. See, e.g., OPEN SECRETS, supra note 7.  
 26. See generally Tim Devaney, Senator: Regulatory caputure a ‘threat’ to govern-
ment, THE HILL (Jan. 30, 2014, 3:03 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation/lobbying/197002-
senator-regulatory-capture-a-threat-to-government (highlighting Senator Sheldon 
Whitehouse’s warning about the power of interest groups and lobbyists).  
 27. ROGER H. DAVIDSON ET AL., CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 377 (14th ed. 2013).   
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corporation a lobbyist represents, to dedicate funds and resources to an 
event or gathering in the hope of obtaining even more one-on-one time 
with certain lawmakers.28 In sum, with the very nature of a lobbyist’s 
job being to obtain the support or vote of a lawmaker, there are justifia-
ble concerns for potential quid pro quo arrangements.   
The second concern regarding the intersection of lobbyists and the 
revolving door effect is the fear of a corporation obtaining undue access 
to the agencies charged with regulating said corporation. Today, more 
than half of the members of Congress who left office in 2012 are regis-
tered as lobbyists.29 As more and more members of Congress accept em-
ployment as lobbyists upon completion of their time in office, the con-
cern of corporations having undue access to the inside governance and 
regulation of the United States continually increases.  
A final concern that exists as a result of the juncture of the revolv-
ing door and lobbying is the occurrence of regulatory capture. For evi-
dence of the risk of regulatory capture—the blurred line between the 
regulatory agency and the industries it is charged with regulating30—
one has to look no further than the leadership change of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in 2014. Currently, CTIA Wireless, 
a nationwide cable and wireless lobbyist association, is led by a former 
FCC commissioner and chairman, and the FCC itself is chaired by an 
individual who was a former CTIA lobbyist.31 This exchange of leader-
ship between the FCC and one of the entities it is charged with regulat-
ing highlights the notion that, as corporations and industries continue 
to grow and expand, they are infiltrating the agencies that are charged 
with regulating them.  
With the nature of lobbying being to influence and persuade deci-
sion-making government officials, the possibilities for corruption are 
endless. With the fear and perception of corruption already prevalent as 
lobbyists and lawmakers interact, there is no question that the effects 
and detriments caused by the revolving door should be limited to what-
ever degree possible. As more and more public officials transition into 
the role of a lobbyist, the risks of quid pro quo arrangements, undue ac-




                                                       
 28. Id. at 377–78.  
 29. Zinnbauer, supra note 11.  
 30. DANGEROUS LIAISONS, supra note 16, at 1.  
 31. Jon Brodkin, Washington’s Revolving Door: Cellular Lobby and FCC Have 
Traded Leaders, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 23, 2014, 12:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/04/washingtons-revolving-door-cellular-lobby-and-fcc-have-traded-leaders/.  
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PART II: FEDERAL RESPONSES TO THE LOBBYIST REVOLVING 
DOOR 
The federal government has been active in addressing the problems 
and concerns resulting from the lobbyist revolving door. Congress has 
enacted three primary measures to combat the problems associated with 
the revolving door effect: (1) transparency measures; (2) direct prohibi-
tions on quid pro quo arrangements; and (3) mandatory waiting peri-
ods.32  After presenting a historical evaluation, this Part discusses each 
measure in turn and explains how each seeks to address the revolving 
door concerns of actual quid pro quo arrangements, undue access, and 
regulatory capture. 
A. Historical Perspective  
Nearly every newly elected President of the United States in mod-
ern history has made some form of disclaimer or political promise that 
he is going to resolve the problems derived from the revolving door at 
the federal level.33 For instance, both Bill Clinton and Barack Obama 
issued executive orders shortly after entering office aimed at closing the 
revolving door in Washington, D.C.34 Furthermore, Presidents on both 
sides of the political aisle have made promises and expressions of con-
cern regarding the revolving door, which shows the revolving door effect 
is neither developed nor argued about based on partisan ideologies.35 
With the revolving door receiving so much attention from Presidents 
early in their terms, it is not surprising that a long line of legislation 
has aimed at closing the revolving door.  
When looking at the variety of revolving door legislation enacted 
throughout the years from a macro perspective, there are three main 
pieces of legislation that directly address the profession of lobbying. 
Most present-day scholars point to the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978, The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, and the Honest Leadership 
and Open Government Act of 2007 as the three pivotal pieces of legisla-
tion concerning the intersection of lobbyist and the revolving door ef-
fect. 36  Collectively, these three pieces of legislation, supplemented 
throughout the years by other legislation, aim to combat the effects of 
the revolving door by demanding transparency measures, prohibiting 
                                                       
 32. See infra Part II.(B)–(D).  
 33. Zaring, supra note 1, at 523–24.  
 34. Id. at 524. Both Presidents made statements about the negative perceptions as-
sociated with the revolving door effect. Clinton infamously stated, “on streets where states-
men once strolled, a never-ending stream of money now changes hands – tying the hands of 
those elected to lead.” Id.   
 35. See generally id. (highlighting the notion that both Republican and Democratic 
Presidents have acknowledged the need for anti-revolving door legislation).  
 36. See Rebecca L. Anderson, The Rules in the Owners’ Box: Lobbying Regulations 
in State Legislature, 40 URB. LAW. 375, 380–87 (2008); see also Zaring, supra note 1, at 524–
26.    
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quid pro quo arrangements, and implementing waiting periods. Along 
with those three main themes, these pieces of legislation also focus on 
the encouragement of ethical practices among individuals in both the 
public and private sectors of employment.37  
In addition, various professions have sought to limit the revolving 
door effect. In the legal profession for example, the Model Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct 1.11, titled  “Special Conflicts of Interest for Former 
and Current Government Officers and Employees,” evidences a concern 
for the effects of the revolving door.38 In short, this rule prohibits a for-
mer government lawyer from representing a private client in a matter 
in which the lawyer participated personally as a public officer or offi-
cial.39 The rule also contains a provision with detailed instruction for 
what a law firm must do in order to avoid the imputation of the former 
public lawyer’s conflicts of interest.40 Although these rules are simply 
“suggested” rules of professional conduct, a majority of states have im-
plemented some rule of this nature into their Rules of Professional Con-
duct for lawyers.41 Along with these ethical provisions, various other 
ethical provisions and codes of conduct have been adopted within the 
medical field, financial advisement field, and other general fields in 
which an individual owes a fiduciary duty to somebody else.42  
Collectively the legislation and conduct rules that have been adopt-
ed provide for: (1) transparency measures; (2) prohibitions on quid pro 
quo arrangement; and (3) implemented waiting periods.  
B. Transparency Measures 
Out of concern for the various effects of the revolving door, the fed-
eral government has implemented measures to increase the transparen-
cy of the dealings between lobbyists and lawmakers.43 Some of these 
measures include: (1) requiring lobbyists to register and account for 
money spent; (2) limiting the amount of money a lobbyist can spend en-
tertaining a public official; and (3) requiring corporations and other in-
                                                       
 37. Id. at 387–93 (comparing Hawaii’s Code of Ethics to the intentions of lawmak-
ers at the federal level).  
 38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.11 (2014). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. See, e.g., IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.11 (2014), 
http://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/rules/irpc.pdf. 
 42. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS; see also 
CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER BOARD CODE OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.  
 43. See Valts Kalniņš, Transparency in Lobbying: Comparative Review of Existing 
and Emerging Regulatory Regimes, CENTRE FOR PUB. POLICY PROVIDUS 1, 5 (2011).  
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dustries to provide detailed reporting of the amount of money annually 
spent on lobbying acts.44 
One of the earliest attempts to increase transparency measures 
came via the Ethics in Government Act (EGA) of 1978.45 This legislation 
was enacted as a response to the Watergate scandals, which ultimately 
led to President Richard Nixon’s resignation.46 As referenced in the act’s 
title, this legislation utilized the fear and societal unrest of the time pe-
riod to promote ideas of ethical government practices.47 The main ac-
complishment of this legislation was the creation of positions granted 
with the jurisdictional power necessary to bring enforcement actions 
against specific members of the executive branch.48 Although the act has 
been amended a few times since its original enactment,49 it still serves 
the purpose of providing government transparency and requiring the 
reporting of certain government expenditures.50  
Following a timeline approach, the next main piece of legislation to 
implement transparency measures was the Lobbyist Disclosure Act 
(LDA) of 1995.51 The enactment of the LDA resulted from the Congres-
sional acknowledgement that: (1) public awareness of the efforts put 
forth by lobbyists to influence policymaking was a necessity of a repre-
sentative government; (2) the former regime of lobbyist legislation was 
ineffective and unclear; and finally (3) an effective accounting of how 
much money was contributed by lobbyists to policy makers would in-
crease the integrity of the government as a whole.52  
LDA remained one of the only means for regulating lobbyists and 
the revolving door overall until 2007, when Congress enacted the Hon-
est Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA).53 The HLOGA was 
enacted for a variety of purposes; however, of pertinence to this article is 
the legislation’s requirement that lobbyists disclose any past employ-
ment within the legislative or executive branches.54 The HLOGA was 
                                                       
 44. See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. 191, 200–03 (2012); see also Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (2007). 
 45. Anderson, supra note 36, at 5. (noting the legislation’s main purpose was to cre-
ate internal structures necessary for monitoring and exacting compliance with existing ethi-
cal regulations). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.; Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).    
 48. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).    
 49. Government Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 
(1989); Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 
735 (2007).  
 50. Anderson, supra note 36, at 6.  
 51. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (1995) (codi-
fied as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§1601–1614). 
 52. William V. Luneburg, The Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation: Where We 
are Now and Where We Should Be Going, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85, 89–90 (2009).  
 53. Id.; Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 
121 Stat. 735 (2007).  
 54. Anderson, supra note 36, at 7 n.95 (citing Section 208 of The Honest Leadership 
and Open Government Act).   
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also responsible for ramping up the number of annual disclosures lobby-
ists were required to make, and it provided several more rules and regu-
lations aimed at increasing the transparency of a lobbyist’s actions.55 
Although the HLOGA is credited with drastically improving the trans-
parency of the daily occurrences at the federal level, it is important to 
note that this legislation is approaching ten years of age and loopholes 
have been, and are continuing to be, exploited. 
In sum, each of the three main pieces of legislation enacted in the 
past several decades to combat the effects of the revolving door have had 
some inherent transparency component.  
C. Prohibitions on Quid Pro Quo Arrangements 
Along with enacting transparency measures, the federal govern-
ment has implemented legislation that negates the effects of the revolv-
ing door by prohibiting quid pro quo arrangements. The benefits of en-
acting legislation to prohibit quid pro quo arrangements are two-fold: it 
encourages ethical dealings between the members of the democratic pro-
cess, and it limits the appearance of impropriety.56 The argument to 
support prohibitions on quid pro quo arrangements is that if both gov-
ernment officials and citizens know of the potential criminal liability for 
engaging in a “this-for-that” exchange, public officials will be deterred 
from engaging in such exchanges. The three main categories of enacted 
laws which the federal government utilizes to deter quid pro quo ar-
rangements are: (1) anti-bribery statutes, (2) statutes addressing mail 
and wire fraud, and (3) various sections of the three main pieces of legis-
lation discussed supra in Part II.A. 
The first type of legislation enacted to combat quid pro quo ar-
rangements concerns the prohibition on bribery. Among the most nota-
ble federal anti-bribery statutes is 18 U.S.C. Section 203, “Compensa-
tion of Members of Congress, officers, and others in matters affecting 
the Government.”57 In short, this statute subjects any individual who 
“demands, seeks, receives, or agrees to receive or accept any compensa-
tion for any representational services . . . ” to penalties and injunc-
tions.58  To supplement anti-bribery statutes, and further dissuade quid 
pro quo arrangements, other federal statutes criminalize money laun-
                                                       
 55. Id. at 8.   
 56. Michael H. Chang, Protecting the Appearance of Propriety: The Policies Underly-
ing the One-Year Ban on Post-Congressional Lobbying Employment, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
121, 122 (1996). 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).  
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 216 (2012) (outlining punishment(s) as: (1) imprisonment for not 
more than one year and a fine for any individual engaging in conduct; and (2) imprisonment 
not in excess of five years and a fine if an individual willfully engages in conduct) (emphasis 
added).  
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dering and racketeering.59 The federal government’s stance on criminal-
izing bribery helps prohibit quid pro quo arrangements and thus deters 
a major effect of the revolving door.  
The federal government also implemented prohibitions on quid pro 
quo arrangements with the enactment of statutes combating mail and 
wire fraud.60 These antifraud provisions prohibit government officials 
from defrauding the citizenry of “the intangible right to honest ser-
vices,”61 which the Supreme Court has interpreted as prohibiting bribery 
and kickback schemes.62 Much like the anti-bribery statutes, this collec-
tion of legislation against various forms of fraud (§§ 1341, 1343 & 1346) 
prohibits quid pro quo arrangements.  
The third source of federal prohibitions on quid pro quo arrange-
ments comes from the EGA, LDA, and HLOGA collectively. Although 
the EGA and LDA do not directly address quid pro quo arrangements, 
they both encourage ethical and open government practices; therefore, 
both inherently prohibit any form of illegal quid pro quo arrangement.63 
The HLOGA specifically addresses and prohibits quid pro quo arrange-
ments.64 Section 102 of the HLOGA is titled “[w]rongfully influencing a 
private entity’s employment decisions or practices.” 65  Much like its 
transparency measures, the HLOGA takes a step in the right direction 
with regard to prescribing prohibitions against quid pro quo arrange-
ments; however, the age of the statute and prevalence of loopholes are 
causes for concern.  
D. Waiting Periods  
The third measure taken by the federal government in its attempt 
to curb the effects of the revolving door is the implementation of waiting 
periods. The federal government—as well as a majority of states—has 
enacted waiting periods to both deter and disable former public officials 
from quickly transferring to private sector employment. Along with act-
ing as a deterrent, waiting periods allow for a turnover of time, person-
nel, and legislation between an individual’s employment in the public 
                                                       
 59. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012) (addressing laundering of money instruments).  
 60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2012).  
 61. Id. at § 1346.  
 62. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010) (concerning the prosecu-
tion of longtime Enron Corporation executive Jeffrey Skilling. Specifically, the case con-
cerned Mr. Skilling’s involvement with the 2001 collapse of Enron Corporation, which in 
prior years had been the seventh highest revenue grossing company in America).  
 63. See generally Ethics in Government Act supra, note 48; see also Lobbyist Disclo-
sure Act supra, note 51 (both acts presumably would discourage any illegal or unethical quid 
pro quo arrangement).  
 64. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act supra, note 49.  
 65. Id. at § 102. Outlining potential fines and imprisonment for any “Member of 
Congress [who] . . . with the intent to influence, solely on the basis of partisan political affili-
ation, an employment decision or employment practice of any private entity.”  
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and private sectors. 66  Several pieces of legislation, including the 
HLOGA,67 address the implementation of waiting periods at the federal 
level. Among these pieces of legislation, the most notable is 18 U.S.C. 
Section 207, “Restrictions on former officers, employees, and elected offi-
cials of the executive and legislative branches.”68 Congress enacted Sec-
tion 207 in 1995 as a means to both limit the effects of the revolving 
door and combat the societal appearance of impropriety.69 
On a general level, Section 207 applies to all former officers or em-
ployees of either the executive or legislative branches of government.70 
The two sections of most relevance to the general topic of the revolving 
door are Sections 207 (a) and (c), although some argument could be 
made that the other sections of the legislation are equally important. 
Section 207(a) imposes permanent restrictions on representation of par-
ticular matters and Section 207(c) applies a one-year restriction on cer-
tain former members of the executive branch and independent agen-
cies.71 On a macro level, these two provisions reduce conflicts of interest 
in the federal government; however, a more microanalysis is necessary 
to see the benefits and pitfalls of each section.  
Section 207(a)(1) contains language that is critical to ensure that 
former government officers and employees are prohibited from using the 
connections and knowledge they acquired while employed by the gov-
ernment to benefit them in the private sector.72 Specifically, the provi-
sion authorizes any former officer or public employee to be punished un-
der 18 U.S.C. Section 21673 if, after the termination of employment with 
the government, he or she communicates or appears before the United 
States on behalf of someone else, with the intention to influence particu-
lar United States employees regarding a matter in which the former 
officer or public employee participated personally and substantially 
while employed by the government.74 In order for this lifetime ban to be 
implemented, however, “the United States must be a party to, or have a 
                                                       
 66. See, e.g., Jeni L. Lassell, The Revolving Door: Should Oregon Restrict Former 
Legislators from Becoming Lobbyists?, 82 OR. L. REV. 979, 990 (2003). 
 67. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, supra note 49, at §101 (increas-
ing the period of ineligibility from one year to two for Senators and senior Congressional staff 
who desire to lobby).  
 68. 18 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1)–(2), (c) (1995). 
 69. Chang, supra note 56, at 122. 
 70. Major Kathryn Stone, The Twilight Zone: Postgovernment Employment Re-
strictions Affecting Retired and Former Department of Defense Personnel, 142 MIL. L. REV. 
67, 70 (1994). 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a), (b) (2012).  
 72. Id. § 207(a)(1).  
 73. Id. § 216 (prescribing the penalties and injunctions for an offense under section 
207). 
 74. See id. § 207(a)(1). 
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direct and substantial interest in, that same particular matter.”75 Sub-
section 207(a)(2) imposes similar representational limitations as subsec-
tion 207(a)(1); however, the time period of prohibited contact lasts for 
only two years rather than life.76 The only substantial difference be-
tween subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) is that the latter applies to particular 
matters that were actually pending under the former officer’s or em-
ployee’s responsibility during the last year of government service, 
whereas the former subsection only requires the employee’s personal 
and substantial participation. 77  The first two subsections of Section 
207(a) are specifically intended to reduce the negative impacts of the 
revolving door created when individuals transfer their employment from 
the public sector to the private sector.78 The legislation ensures that a 
former officer or government employee cannot use the knowledge and 
contacts acquired while employed with the federal government in litiga-
tion or representation occurring immediately after the conclusion of em-
ployment with the government.  
The second relevant provision of 18 U.S.C. Section 207 is Section 
207(c). This provision implements a one-year period of time that must 
expire before a former government officer or employee is permitted to 
communicate with, or appear before, the agency that employed him or 
her.79 This Section ensures that upon the expiration of a government 
worker’s employment, the former government worker is not permitted to 
immediately advocate in front of the agency for which he or she was em-
ployed, on behalf of another.80 Since enactment, this Section has become 
the subject of debate concerning whether the one-year requirement is 
too short, too long, or simply unnecessary.81       
In sum, the federal level has implemented three approaches—
transparency measures, direct prohibitions on quid pro quo arrange-
ments, and waiting periods—which work together to combat the prob-
lems associated with the revolving door.  At the state level, however, not 
every state has adopted all three measures, which potentially allows the 
problems posed by the revolving door to flourish. It is this lack of legis-
lation, particularly in Idaho, which will be the focus of the remainder of 





                                                       
 75. Stone, supra note 70, at 71.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. See id. at 83. 
 79. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (2012).  
 80. Stone, supra note 70, at 72.  
 81. This debate is evidenced by the different lengths of time each state chooses to 
codify when enacting their own waiting period legislation. See infra Part IV.  
2016 BEHIND THE TIMES: A COMPARATIVE 
ARGUMENT THAT THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SHOULD COMBAT THE REVOLVING DOOR 
EFFECT WITH WAITING PERIOD LEGISLATION 
653 
 
PART III: IDAHO’S RESPONSES TO THE LOBBYIST REVOLVING 
DOOR 
Idaho, like the federal government, has developed and implement-
ed methods to mitigate the effects of the lobbyist revolving door. Unlike 
the federal government, however, Idaho has only implemented trans-
parency measure and prohibitions on quid pro quo arrangements and 
has chosen not to enact waiting period legislation. After presenting a 
historical perspective of Idaho, this Part explains the contours of Idaho’s 
current responses to the lobbyist revolving door and seeks to identify an 
explanation or rationale for the absence of waiting period legislation in 
Idaho. 
A. Historical Perspective for Idaho  
Idaho became the 43rd state on July 3, 1890 and is currently the 
13th largest state in the United States.82 With a vast amount of land and 
a population of roughly 1.6 million persons, most of Idaho can be de-
scribed as rural.83 With the layout of Idaho consisting of two or three 
medium sized metropolitan areas surrounded by intermingled rural 
towns, the state’s government has always been known for its generally 
clean, small-town, reputation.84 Some individuals credit this small town 
mentality for the absence of waiting period legislation in Idaho; howev-
er, those same individuals are beginning to see the small town mentality 
dwindle as long-tenured government officials are replaced by members 
of the younger generation.85  
The idea of enacting legislation to mitigate the effects of the revolv-
ing door is not new to the state of Idaho. Several variations of legislation 
that would limit the effects of the  revolving door have been proposed, 
and discussed, in Idaho’s political history; however, none of said legisla-
tion has ever been approved by both houses of Idaho legislature, let 
alone enacted.86   
                                                       
 82. IDAHO DEP’T OF COMMERCE, About Idaho, VISIT IDAHO, 
http://www.visitidaho.org/facts-about-idaho/  (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).  
 83. State and Country Quickfacts: Idaho, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/16000.html (last visited Mar. 1 , 2016) (Idaho’s esti-
mated population for 2014 was 1,634,464 persons) [hereinafter IDAHO – U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU].  
 84. See Betsey Russell, Idaho gets D- in 2012 State Integrety Invesitgation, CTR. FOR 
PUB. INTEGRITY, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/03/19/18170/idaho-gets-d-grade-2012-
state-integrity-investigation (updated Nov. 2, 2015) (discussing Idaho’s early government).  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
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B. Idaho’s Transparency Measures 
Idaho’s Secretary of State is the individual charged with informing 
lobbyists, and the public at large, about what requirements must be sat-
isfied before and during an individual’s term as a lobbyist.87 Idaho Code 
Section 67-6602 defines the terms “lobby” and “lobbying" as, “attempting 
through contact with, or causing others to make contact with, members 
of the legislature or legislative committees or an executive official, to 
influence the approval, modification or rejection of any legislation . . . or 
to develop or maintain relationships with, promote goodwill with, or en-
tertain members of the legislature or executive officials.”88 Furthermore, 
the Secretary of State’s website provides that “[a]ll persons doing lobby-
ing must register with the Secretary of State unless they fall under of 
the criteria to be exempt from registration.”89 Along with establishing 
the general parameters and guidelines for lobbyists, the Secretary of 
State’s webpage provides information about: lobbyist registration re-
quirements, currently registered lobbyists, and various forms necessary 
for registering and working as a lobbyist.90  
Generally, for an individual to be a lobbyist in the state of Idaho he 
or she must complete and file a Lobbyist Registration Statement with 
the Secretary of State.91 An individual must satisfy this requirement 
either prior to engaging in any act of lobbying or within thirty days after 
becoming employed as a lobbyist.92 Furthermore, if an individual is em-
ployed as a lobbyist for more than one company or interest, he or she 
must file a separate Lobbyist Registration Statement for each position.93 
Finally, with regard to registering as a lobbyist, a ten-dollar filing fee 
must accompany each Lobbyist Registration Statement, and an individ-
ual is required to re-register on an annual basis.94 The basic guidelines 
for registering as a lobbyist in the state of Idaho tend to follow the 
standard guidelines of jurisdictions across the United States.95  
Each registered lobbyist is required by the State of Idaho to furnish 
periodic spending reports depending on whether they lobby to the legis-
                                                       
 87. Welcome from the Idaho Secretary of State, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
OF IDAHO, http://www.sos.idaho.gov/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (discussing the variety of 
tasks the Idaho Secretary of State is charged with completing).   
 88. IDAHO CODE § 67-6602(j) (2014); see also Lobbyist Registration Requirements, 
IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/lobbyist/lobbyist.htm (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Idaho Lobbyist Registration Requirements].   
 89. Idaho Lobbyist Registration Requirements, supra note 8888.  
 90. Id.   
 91. Id.   
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Idaho Lobbyist Registration Requirements, supra note 88. 
 95. See generally Lobbyist Registration Requirements, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-lobbyist-
registration-requirements.aspx (providing a general overview of the lobbyist registration 
requirements in all fifty states).   
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lative or executive branches.96 Legislative lobbyists are expected to file 
monthly reports for each month the legislature is in session as well as 
file an annual report; however, executive lobbyists only need to file re-
ports on a semi-annual and annual basis.97 The Idaho Reporting Manual 
for Registered Lobbyists further explains that a lobbyist must report, 
“[e]xpenditures made or incurred directly or indirectly for any lobbying 
purpose.”98 The necessary expenditures to be reported include but are 
not limited to: (A) Entertainment, Food and Refreshments, (B) Living 
Accommodations, (C) Advertising, Travel, Telephone, and (D) Other.99 
The Reporting Manual further describes the details each lobbyist must 
provide and lists the potential civil penalties and fines associated with a 
failure to comply with the lobbyist reporting requirements.100 Although 
the Idaho Reporting Manual for Registered Lobbyists lays out several 
requirements and obligations necessary to become a lobbyist, not all 
lobbyist expenditures are recorded due to various exemptions.101  
Idaho Code Sections 67-6618(a)-(f) provide a list of persons and 
scenarios that are exempt from having to register as a lobbyist in the 
state of Idaho.102 Among the individuals who are exempt are: lobbyists 
who do not receive compensation for lobbying; lobbyists who are com-
pensated less than $250 in any calendar quarter;103 and lobbyists who 
are employees of a corporation, if said corporation has registered as a 
corporation and designated one or more of its employees as a lobbyist.104 
In sum, certain lobbyist expenditures are not documented, which limits 
the overall transparency of lobbyist activity in Idaho.   
In 2015, there were 449 lobbyists registered in the state of Idaho 
alone.105 The same registry reports that there were 427 registered lobby-
                                                       
 96. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Lobbying Activity, IDAHO SECRETARY OF 
STATE, http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/lobbyist/lobbyfaq.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2016). 
 97. Id.  
 98. IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE, REPORTING MANUAL FOR REGISTERED LOBBYISTS 
4–5, (2015) 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/lobbyist/2015/2015_Lobbyist_Reporting_Manual.pdf [herein-
after REPORTING MANUAL].  
 99. Id. at 5.  
100. Id. at 6, 8.  
101. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Lobbyist Activity, supra note 96.  
102. IDAHO CODE § 67-6618 (2014) (exempting the following categories of persons 
from registration: individuals who only lobby before public sessions; persons employed at 
entities engaged in the business of publishing or broadcasting; persons who receive little to 
no compensation; elected state officers and executive officers; persons representing a bona 
fide church; and employees of a corporation).  
103. Id. § 67-6618(c).  
104. Id. § 67-6618(f)(1)(i)-(ii).  
105. Lobbyists with Employers for 2015, supra note 22.   
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ists in the state of Idaho in 2014.106 Of the lobbyists registered in Idaho, 
some are employed by a single entity, corporation, or interest group; 
whereas, other lobbyists are employed by multiple industries with vari-
ous interests.107 Most lobbyists in the Treasure Valley area charge a flat 
rate for their services, which can vary depending on the goals and inter-
ests of their employer.108 Although the rates tend to vary, a “typical” rate 
in the Treasure Valley can range anywhere from $15,000 to $75,000.109 
There are currently no laws in Idaho’s code to limit the amount of com-
pensation a lobbyist is entitled to receive; however, there are rules and 
prohibitions against any lobbyist receiving extra compensation for suc-
cessfully pushing a bill through Idaho’s Legislature.110  
In conclusion, Idaho’s Secretary of State is charged with the regula-
tion and oversight of lobbyists within the state. An individual who de-
sires to become a lobbyist, and influence lawmakers, may do so after 
simply filing a form accompanied with ten dollars.111 Although the state 
of Idaho has installed some procedural safeguards to control lobbyists, 
the state could improve the transparency of the interactions between its 
lawmakers and private lobbyists.  
C. Idaho’s Prohibitions on Quid Pro Quo Arrangements 
Similar to the steps taken at the federal level, the state of Idaho 
has enacted legislation aimed at implementing prohibitions on quid pro 
quo arrangements.112 Chapter 13 of the Idaho Code addresses various 
forms of Bribery and Corruption.113 More specifically, Idaho Code Sec-
tion 18-1352 prohibits “[b]ribery in official and political matters.”114 This 
Section states that an individual is guilty of a felony “if he offers, confers 
or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, accepts or agrees to accept 
from another . . . as a public servant, party official or voter . . . . ”115 
Along the same lines, Idaho Code Section 18-1353 prohibits an individu-
al from “[threatening] harm to any public servant or party official with 
purpose to influence him to violate his known legal duty . . . . ”116 Ana-
lyzed together, these statutes look very similar to the anti-bribery and 
                                                       
106. Id. (The correct PDF for the lobbyist registration in year 2014 can be found at 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/lobbyist/2014lobemp.pdf).  
107. Id.  
108. Audrey Dutton, The Lawyers Behind the Legislature: Idaho Attorneys Who Lob-
by and Draft Bills Say The Capitol Has Changed, IDAHO STATESMAN 22, 22 
http://issuu.com/idahostatesman/docs/1119_bizinsider (Nov. 2014).  
109. Id.  
110. Id.  
111. REPORTING MANUAL, supra note 98, at 1–2. 
112. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-7802 (2004) (prohibiting racketeering practices); see 
also IDAHO CODE § 18-8201 (2004) (prohibiting money laundering and illegal investment).   
113. See IDAHO CODE §§ 18-1301 through 18-1362 (2004).  
114. Id. § 18-1352.  
115. Id.  
116. Id. § 18-1353(1)(c).  
2016 BEHIND THE TIMES: A COMPARATIVE 
ARGUMENT THAT THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SHOULD COMBAT THE REVOLVING DOOR 
EFFECT WITH WAITING PERIOD LEGISLATION 
657 
 
anti-fraud statutes enacted by the federal government to combat quid 
pro quo arrangements.   
The Idaho Code as it pertains to bribery and various types of fraud 
is comparable to the legislation enacted at the federal level as a means 
to prohibit quid pro quo arrangements. Although Idaho’s statutory 
structure and conduct coverage is very limited compared to the federal 
statutes, the state has made some efforts to limit quid pro quo arrange-
ments within its government. 
D. Absence of Waiting Period Legislation in Idaho 
The third measure taken by the federal government to limit the ef-
fects of the revolving door, as it pertains to lobbyists, is the implementa-
tion of waiting periods.117 As noted above, the federal government has 
enacted, and is currently in the process of enhancing, a required expira-
tion of time before an individual can accept employment as a lobbyist 
upon the completion of his or her time in public office.118 Idaho, on the 
other hand, does not have any form of waiting period legislation. There-
fore, an individual may accept employment as a lobbyist immediately 
upon the completion of his or her term(s) in office.   
When analyzing the enactment of waiting periods from a national 
standpoint, Idaho is among the minority of states without any waiting 
period legislation.119 Currently, at least thirty-three states have enacted 
and implemented some type of waiting period before former public offi-
cials are permitted to accept jobs in the private sector as a lobbyist.120 Of 
the remaining states, nine have not adopted any form of waiting period 
legislation.121  Within the thirty-three states that have adopted some 
form of waiting period legislation, the prescribed periods of time that a 
former public official must wait before obtaining private sector employ-
ment ranges anywhere from two years122 to the end of the next legisla-
tive term.123 Even though the period of time a former government em-
ployee is required to wait varies across the states who have implement-
                                                       
117. See supra Part II.D. 
118. Id.  
119. National Conference of State Legislatures, Rules Against Legislators Lobbying 
State Government After They Leave Office, NCSL.ORG (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-revolving-door-prohibitions.aspx [hereinaf-
ter Revolving Door Prohibitions].   
120. Id.  
121. Id. (identifying states without waiting period legislation as: Idaho, Illinois, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming).   
122. Id. (listing states with two-year bans as: Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, New York, and Oklahoma).  
123. Id. (listing states with a variation of waiting period determinate on the expira-
tion of a specific legislative term as: Maryland, Michigan, and Oregon).  
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ed such legislation, a vast majority of states at least have some form of 
waiting period legislation on the books.124 
In sum, the state of Idaho has acted similarly to the federal gov-
ernment with regard to implementing transparency measures and en-
acting prohibitions on quid pro quo arrangements; however, Idaho is 
among a minority of states without waiting period legislation. The re-
maining sections of this article focus on attempting to decipher a reason 
or explanation as to why the state of Idaho does not have such waiting 
period legislation.  
PART IV: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATES 
This Part seeks to determine if there is something unique about 
Idaho, such that waiting period legislation is not necessary to combat 
the problems associated with the lobbyist revolving door. Specifically, 
this inquiry is conducted by comparing Idaho to the eight other states 
within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—Alaska, 
Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana and Arizo-
na.125 Although Idaho is the state of most importance for purposes of 
this article, the other eight states within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction 
provide various reference points for comparisons. The main reason(s) 
and purpose for comparing the nine states within the Ninth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction is to try to identify a factor, or set of factors, that help ex-
plain why Idaho is the only state in the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction that 
has not enacted waiting period legislation.126       
The nine states within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction were chosen 
due to their relative similarities in geography, demographics, and politi-
cal culture. Although the nine states are by no means identical with re-
gard to these three main categories, the variety of states provide a well-
rounded look at the different degrees of waiting period legislation within 
the western United States. This part compares these nine states in four 
areas: (1) political ideology; (2) population; (3) prevalence of waiting pe-
riod legislation; and (4) each state’s base ratio.  
A. Methodology  
The nine states subject to the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals are Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, California, 
Idaho, Nevada, Montana, and Arizona.127 Generally speaking, the nine 
states chosen are geographically located in the western portion of the 
                                                       
124. Id.  
125. United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Map of the Ninth Circuit, 
USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000135 (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2016). 
126. Revolving Door Prohibitions, supra note 119.  
127. Map of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 125. While it is acknowledged that some 
smaller islands and United States territories are also subject to Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, 
the main focus for our purpose are the states within the jurisdiction. Id.   
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United States128 and make up a population of roughly 63 million peo-
ple.129  
The first two categories of comparison are the political ideology and 
population of each state. Of the nine states, three of them—Hawaii, Or-
egon, and California—have a political ideology of Democratic, five of 
them—Alaska, Idaho, Nevada, Montana, and Arizona—declare their 
political ideology as Republican, and one state—Washington—is cur-
rently split.130 For purposes of this methodology, the overall political 
ideology of each state was determined in reference to the political party 
holding a majority of seats in both the state’s Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives.131 The ideology of each independent state helps to provide 
some background into the political culture of said states, as well as high-
lights the willingness of each state to adopt new legislation.132  
Along with political affiliation providing a fairly even split between 
the nine selected comparative states, the actual population of each state 
also creates an equal split. When using a population of two million per-
sons per state as a baseline, there are four states - Alaska, Hawaii, Ida-
ho, and Montana - with populations below the line, while five of the 
states - Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, and Arizona - have a 
population above the 2 million persons threshold.133  
The third category of comparison is the prevalence, or absence, of 
waiting period legislation enacted in the state. Within this category, 
Idaho is the only state that has not enacted some form of waiting period 
legislation.134 Figure 1 provides information in a graphical format based 
on each state’s political ideology,135 waiting period legislation,136 popula-
tion,137 number of establishments,138 and base ratio.139 
                                                       
128. See id.   
129. United Stated Census Bureau, Quickfacts United States, CENSUS.GOV, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (it is important to note 
that the most recent census data was gathered in 2012, and the numbers used in this calcu-
lation represent the “estimated 2014 population” of each respected state).  
130. 2015 State and Legislative Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Legis_Control_2015_Feb4_11am.pdf 
(Feb. 4, 2015, 11:00 AM) (calculating numbers based on total number of seats controlled by 
either Democratic or Republican members of the state legislature).  
131. See id.  
132. The argument supporting the latter assertion in this sentence is that generally 
states with a Republican-controlled legislature are in session for shorter amounts of time and 
are less likely to disrupt the overall status quo. It can be inferred  from this shorter duration 
of time in session, less legislation and changes will be implemented. See, e.g., National Con-
ference of State Legislatures, Legislative Session Length, NCSL.ORG 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-session-length.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2016).    
133. See infra Figure 1.  
134. Revolving Door Prohibitions, supra note 119.  
135. 2015 State and Legislative Partisan Composition, supra note 130. 




 Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the similarities and 
differences between the nine states within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdic-
tion. The chart also develops a ratio for comparison, which will be re-
                                                                                                                                
136. Revolving Door Prohibitions, supra note 119. 
137. Quickfacts United States, supra note 129. 
138. State and Country Quickfacts: Idaho, supra note 83. It is important to note that 
in order to obtain the number of each states’ establishments the U.S. Census Bureau site 
was navigated accordingly. For purposes of this comparison, the statistic referred to as “Pri-
vate nonfarm Establishments, 2013” was utilized. The U.S. Census Bureau defines this term 
as “a single physical location at which business is conducted or where services or industrial 
operations are performed.” Furthermore, the U.S. Census Bureau states, when two or more 
activities are conducted at a single location under a single ownership, said activities are 
grouped together as one “Establishment.” It was important to compare the nine states based 
on number of establishments the increased prevalence of businesses would result in more 
lobbyists, lobbying for said entities interests, which of course is the focus of this article. The 
importance of utilizing such measure will be discussed further below. 
139. The base ratio is determined by dividing the number of persons per state by the 
total number of establishments in that state. This number gives a balanced variable to com-
pare each state within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction.   
Figure 1.  
Waiting Period Legislation Within the Ninth Circuit’s Jurisdictional States 
State Political  Ideology 





ments Base Ratio  
Alaska  Republi-can 1 Year 736,732 20,519 35.90 
Hawaii  Democrat-ic 1 Year 1,419,561 31,622 44.89 
Washington Split 1 Year 7,061,530 176,815 39.94 
Oregon Democrat-ic Session Limit 3,970,239 108,527 36.58 
California Democrat-ic 1 Year 38,802,500 874,243 44.38 
Idaho Republi-can None 1,634,464 43,124 37.90 
Nevada Republi-can 
Session Limit (Pend-
ing) 2,839,099 60,306 47.08 
Montana  Republi-can 2 Years 1,023,579 36,529 28.02 
Arizona Republi-can 1 Year 6,731,484 132,762 50.70 
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ferred to as the “Base Ratio.” Each state’s base ratio is determined by 
dividing the number of persons per state by the total number of estab-
lishments within said state. Take for example, the state of Alaska—with 
a population of 736,732140 persons and a total number of 20,519 estab-
lishments reported141—its base ratio is 35.90. The base ratio of Alaska is 
determined by dividing the population (736,732) by the total number of 
establishments (20,519), thus yielding a base ration of 35.90. The base 
ratio eliminates any disparity among the population of each state, while 
providing a number that is a fair and accurate representation of each 
state.  
Using the base ratio as a beginning point for further analysis it is 
important to note that the mean base ratio of all nine states within the 
Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction is 40.59.142 Much like political ideology and 
population, the base ratio of each state provides a fairly equal split be-
tween the nine states. Five of the states—Alaska, Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho and Montana—have a base ratio below the mean ratio; whereas, 
the other four states—Hawaii, California, Nevada and Arizona—have 
base ratios above the mean ratio.143 The mean base ratio can show sev-
eral things and a further explanation of the number might prove benefi-
cial.  
With the base ratio being the result of the state’s population divid-
ed by the number of establishments within that state, the ratio directly 
reflects the number of persons per establishment in each state. As de-
fined by the United States Census, an establishment is “a single physi-
cal location at which business is conducted or where services or indus-
trial operations are performed.”144 Therefore, the base ratio provides in-
sight to the prevalence of business type operations in each of the nine 
states within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction. The prevalence of business 
operations in each state is an important statistic to consider based on 
the fact that businesses, both large and small, tend to devote a large 
amount of resources to lobbying.145 In sum, the base ratio is a statistical 
number that provides a snapshot of the number of persons per business 
operations in each of the nine states.      
                                                       
140. Quickfacts United States, supra note 129. 
141. State & County Quickfacts: Alaska, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).  
142. The sum of all nine states’ basis ratio divided by the total number of states.  
143. Figure 1, supra Part IV.A. 
144. See State and Country Quickfacts: Idaho, supra note 83 (defining “Establish-
ment”). 
145. See, e.g., Jesse Solomon, Top 10 Companies Lobbying Washington, CNNMONEY 
(Oct. 1, 2014, 11:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/10/01/investing/companies-lobbying-10-
biggest-spenders/.  
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In conclusion, the methodology in this comparative analysis focuses 
on four main factors: (1) political ideology; (2) population; (3) prevalence 
of waiting period legislation; and (4) each state’s base ratio. Collectively, 
these four factors allow for an analytical comparison based on geograph-
ic location, political culture, and demographic makeup.  
B. Findings 
A comparison of the nine states within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdic-
tion using the multitude of factors discussed supra yields some interest-
ing findings. This section aims to break down each of the four main 
comparative factors and highlight why none of the four factors provide 
an explanation as to why the state of Idaho is different in a way that it 
does not need waiting period legislation to combat the effects of the re-
volving door.  
As noted above, the political makeup of the nine states within the 
Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction is fairly evenly split with three Democratic, 
five Republican, and one Split state (the split state of Washington has 
predominately been Democratic in the past).146 Although it would be im-
proper to conclude that Idaho’s political ideology alone explains its lack 
of waiting door legislation, it is interesting to note the degree to which 
Idaho is conservatively governed. Currently, Idaho’s Governor, Lieuten-
ant Governor, eighty (80) percent of the State Senate seats, and eighty 
(80) percent of the State House of Representatives seats are affiliated 
with the Republican Party.147 Furthermore, all four members of Idaho’s 
Congressional Delegation, two Senators and two Congressmen, are also 
members of the Republican Party.148  
Figure 2 compares the political ideology of Idaho’s legislature with 
that of the other Republican states within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdic-
tion. The graphic highlights the fact that eighty percent of the seats in 
Idaho’s House and Senate are Republican; whereas Alaska, the next 
most conservative state, only has seventy percent of the seats in the 
Senate and fifty-eight percent of the seats in the House filled by Repub-
lican members.149  
 
                                                       
146. 2015 State and Legislative Partisan Composition, supra note 130. 
147. Id.  
148. Idaho, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members/ID (last visit-
ed Feb. 11, 2016) (noting Idaho’s senators are Michael Crapo and Jim Risch and Idaho’s con-
gressmen are Raul Labrador and Michael Simpson). 
149. 2015 State and Legislative Partisan Composition, supra note 130 (each percent-
age was determined by dividing the number of Republican seats by the total number of seats 
in both the Senate and House of Representatives). 
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Figure 2 demonstrates the fact that when analyzing the political 
ideology of each state within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, Idaho is 
definitely an outlier on the Conservative end of the spectrum. Although 
Idaho is considerably more conservative than the other states, the dif-
ference in political ideology alone does not explain the absence of wait-
ing period legislation in Idaho. It would require too much of an inferen-
tial step, concerning the “tendencies” of conservative governments, to 
conclude that political ideology is the sole reason for the absence of the 
legislation in Idaho. Furthermore, the political ideology argument is 
disputed by the fact that each one of the three other Republican states 
within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction have, or are in the process of en-
acting,150 waiting period legislation. In conclusion, although Idaho is an 
outlier on the conservative end of the political spectrum, that alone does 
not explain the lack of waiting period legislation in the state.  
The second factor considered in the comparative analysis is the 
population of each state. The vast discrepancy in population between 
the nine states causes this factor to be less relevant in the comparison. 
With the population of California being more than fifty times that of 
Alaska, using population as a means of comparison is simply not relia-
                                                       
150. Sandra Chereb, Legislative ‘cooling off’ lobbying law passes Nevada Senate, LAS 
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (May 20, 2015, 6:58 PM), 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada-legislature/legislative-cooling-lobbying-law-
passes-nevada-senate. Nevada’s Senate gave legislative approval for the state’s new waiting 
period legislation that will take effect November 8, 2016.  









Figure	  2.	  Percentage	  of	  Republican	  Seats	  
in	  Ninth	  Circuit's	  Jurisdictional	  State	  
Governments
Senate House
664 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 52 
 
ble. Although the raw population of each state is less helpful in this 
comparative analysis, the population of each state is a key factor in each 
state’s base ratio. In conclusion, although the nine states can be evenly 
split when using two million persons as a baseline (four states with 
populations below, and five states with populations above),151 this factor 
also does not explain Idaho’s lack of waiting period legislation.      
The prevalence or absence of waiting period legislation is the third 
factor considered in this comparative analysis. Of the nine states within 
the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, Idaho is the only state without some 
form of waiting period legislation.152 Of the remaining eight states, five 
have implemented a one-year waiting period, one has adopted a two-
year waiting period, and two have a session-limit waiting period.153 
When analyzed at a national level using all fifty states, Idaho is one of 
only nine states that does not have waiting period legislation.154 Alt-
hough this factor highlights the fact that Idaho is among the extreme 
minority of states without waiting period legislation, the factor is very 
similar to political ideology and population in that it provides little ex-
planation as to why.  
The final factor of comparison is the base ratio, which was deter-
mined by dividing each state’s population by the number of establish-
ments in that state. With businesses arguably being the main contribu-
tors to the act of lobbying,155 it is important to quantify the amount of 
business in each state and see if that impacts the state’s enactment of 
waiting period legislation. As noted above, the mean base ratio of the 
nine states within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction is 40.59.156 The base 
ratio illustrates the amount of business operations in each state and 
allows a more balanced comparison between states with drastic popula-
tion differences. Idaho, with a base ratio of 37.90, does not have any 
form of waiting period legislation, while Washington and Oregon both 
have such legislation, and they have similar base ratios of 39.94 and 
36.58 respectively.157 Therefore, base ratio alone does not explain why 
the other eight states have waiting period legislation and Idaho does 
not.  
In conclusion, the comparison of the nine states based on: (1) politi-
cal ideology, (2) population, (3) prevalence of revolving door legislation, 
and (4) base ratio, is not outcome-determinative. Although factors such 
as political ideology and prevalence of waiting period legislation place 
Idaho as an outlier in comparison to the other eight states, nothing in 
the comparison explains the reason for the absence of any legislation in 
                                                       
151. Figure 1, supra Part IV.A. 
152. Revolving Door Prohibitions, supra note 119119. 
153. Id.  
154. Id.  
155. See, e.g., Dorie Apollonio et al., Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Cor-
ruption Paradigm, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 14 (2008).  
156. Figure 1, supra Part IV.A. 
157. Id.  
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Idaho. Therefore, this analysis undercuts the suggestion that there 
might be something unique about Idaho such that it does not need wait-
ing period legislation to combat the effects of the revolving door on lob-
bying activity within the state.  
PART V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IDAHO 
A. Need for Waiting Period Legislation in Idaho 
The analysis in the preceding Part failed to identify a reason why 
Idaho does not need waiting period legislation to combat the problems 
associated with the lobbyist revolving door. Indeed, it is no secret that 
former Idaho public officials make up a large population of individuals 
currently employed as lobbyists in the state where they used to hold of-
fice.158 In 2011, there were at least one dozen former state legislators 
registered and employed with private entities and industries within the 
state of Idaho.159 One of the more notable transfers that caught the eye 
of Idaho media in 2012 was when the former chief of staff for Idaho’s 
Governor accepted employment as a lobbyist for Idaho Power—only 
three months after ceasing to be a Governor’s aide.160 The revolving door 
effect was further evident in early 2015 when Idaho’s former Secretary 
of State accepted employment with a large local lobbying firm only a few 
months after ending his twelve-year stint as Secretary of State.161 These 
few examples of individuals immediately becoming lobbyists upon the 
cessation of their public term(s) highlight the notion that Idaho current-
ly does not have any waiting period legislation enacted.  
Although this is a very abbreviated history of the revolving door in 
Idaho, it is evidence enough to conclude that the revolving door effect is 
not a foreign concept to the state of Idaho. While no blame is placed on 
any individual who has utilized the revolving door between the public 
and private sector, the appearance of impropriety becomes stronger as 
more individuals traverse between the two realms of employment. As 
prior sections have highlighted, the state of Idaho has already taken the 
initiative to implement two out of three revolving door mitigation 
                                                       
158. Russell, supra note 84. 
159. Id. 
160. Betsy Russell, Second Former Top State Official Becomes Idaho Power Lobbyist, 
SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2012/jan/06/second-former-top-state-official-becomes-
idaho-power-lobbyist/.  
161. Team, GALLATIN PUBLIC AFFAIRS, http://gallatinpa.com/team.php (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2016); Scott Graf, Ysursa Worries About Idaho’s Low Voter Turnout, Not Denney’s 
Partisanship, BOISE STATE PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://boisestatepublicradio.org/post/ysursa-worries-about-idahos-low-voter-turnout-not-
denneys-partisanship. 
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measures,162 so why not take the next step and adopt waiting period leg-
islation?  
B. Proposal Waiting Period Legislation for Idaho 
The focus of the remainder of this article is to analyze and propose 
specific legislation that Idaho should enact, drawing guidance from the 
legislation in the other Republican states within the Ninth Circuit’s Ju-
risdiction—Alaska, Arizona, and Montana.163 Not only do all three of 
these states have some form of waiting period legislation enacted, the 
different legislation adopted by each state also provides a spectrum of 
the possible levels of waiting period legislation. 
First, the state of Alaska has enacted waiting period legislation 
that would be on the low end of the spectrum due to the statute’s vague-
ness and availability of loopholes. Alaska Statute Section 24.45.121 gen-
erally addresses the prohibitions of a lobbyist in the state of Alaska.164 
Section 24.45.121(c) states: “A former member of the legislature may not 
engage . . . as a lobbyist before the legislature for a period of one-year 
after the former member has left the legislature.”165 Although the stat-
ute implements a one-year waiting period, the same section also permits 
former members to act as “volunteer lobbyist,” which provides a large 
loophole to the enacted waiting period.166 Although Alaska’s legislation 
places it at the bottom of this comparative spectrum, some waiting peri-
od is better than no waiting period. 
Continuing along the spectrum, the state of Arizona’s waiting peri-
od legislation places the state between Alaska and Montana. Arizona 
Revised Statutes Section 38-504 addresses “Prohibited acts” with regard 
to public officers and employees. 167  Specifically, this code provision 
states: “A public officer or employee shall not represent another person 
for compensation before a public agency by which the officer or employee 
is or was employed within the preceding twelve months.”168 The statute 
further prohibits a public officer or employee from disclosing any infor-
mation obtained in his or her course of duty for two years after the expi-
ration of his or her term.169 Much like the state of Alaska, Arizona’s leg-
islation enacts a one-year waiting period; however, it does not provide 
for any voluntary lobbying as the Alaska statute does.170  
At the furthest end of the spectrum, the state of Montana has en-
acted more stringent waiting period legislation.171 Montana has a two-
                                                       
162. See supra Part III.(B)-(C).  
163. 2015 State and Legislative Partisan Composition, supra note 130. 
164. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 24.45.121 (West 2015).  
165. Id. at § 24.45.121(c) (West 2015).  
166. Id.  
167. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-504 (2015).  
168. Id. §38-504(a) (2015).  
169. Id. §38-504(b) (2015).  
170. See generally id.   
171. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-2-105 (West 2015).  
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fold approach to limiting the effects of the revolving door. First, Section 
2-2-105(3) broadly states: “A public officer or public employee may not, 
within 12 months following the voluntary termination of officer or em-
ployment . . . take direct advantage, unavailable to others, of matters 
which [he or she] was directly involved.”172 Second, Section 5-7-310 di-
rectly prohibits an individual from being licensed as a lobbyist if during 
the 2 years prior to applying for the license that person “served as a 
state legislator, elected state official, department director . . . or member 
of a certain personal staff.”173 
With this spectrum of legislation enacted among the Republican 
states within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction in mind, Idaho should fol-
low Montana’s lead and enact robust waiting period legislation. In fol-
lowing Montana’s lead, Idaho’s goal should be two-fold and combat the 
revolving door effect with both a macro and micro level approach. The 
first, macro approach, should be to hold all of Idaho’s public officials to a 
heightened ethical standard, prohibiting them from using their govern-
mental position in a manner that will provide them an advantage unat-
tainable to others. The second, micro approach, should be to implement 
a waiting period of at least one, but preferably two, years before a for-
mer public official can accept employment as a lobbyist. In line with this 
second goal, Idaho should strive to eliminate any potential loopholes for 
“voluntary lobbying.” Therefore, the state of Idaho should enact the fol-
lowing waiting period statute: 
Any public officer or employee may not, within one year of ter-
mination of public employment, obtain employment in which he 
or she will take any direct advantage, unavailable to others, of 
matters in which he or she was involved during his or her term 
of office or governmental employment. Furthermore, an individ-
ual may not register or act as a lobbyist if during the two years 
prior to registering or acting as a lobbyist that individual: (1) 
served as a state legislator, public official, or certain official per-
sonnel, or (2) was employed in any other governmental capacity. 
The prohibition on registering or acting as a lobbyist does not 
apply to an individual who is required to lobby as part of the in-
dividual’s responsibilities as an employee of state or local gov-
ernment. 
Idaho’s Secretary of State shall issue regulations that define the 
terms of this statute, implement an enforcement regime, and 
prescribe the punishments for violating this statute.   
                                                       
172. Id. at § 2-2-105(3).  
173. Id. at § 5-7-310. 
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The above statute would not only provide Idaho with much needed 
waiting period legislation, it would also place Idaho leaps and bounds 
ahead of several other states within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction and 
the United States as a whole.  
PART VI: CONCLUSION 
The main focus of this article has been to inform the public at large 
about the reoccurring negative effects associated with the revolving door 
of employment transfers between the public and private sectors. More 
specifically, the article highlights the notion that, although the federal 
government and the majority of states utilize three primary approach-
es—transparency measures, prohibitions on quid pro quo arrangements, 
and implementation of waiting periods—to combat the effects of the re-
volving door, Idaho has only enacted two of those approaches. In an ef-
fort to find an explanation for the absence of waiting period legislation 
in Idaho, Idaho was compared to the eight other states within the juris-
diction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The comparative analysis 
yielded no reason or explanation as to why Idaho is different from the 
majority of states such that it does not need legislation of this nature. In 
conclusion, Idaho should enact the waiting period legislation proposed in 
this article so that it is no longer Behind the Times. 
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